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Abstract 
The authors describe the liabilities model of the Exchange Fund Account (EFA). The 
EFA is managed using an asset-liability matching framework that requires currency and 
duration matching of both sides of the balance sheet. The model chooses the mix of 
liabilities across instruments and tenors that maximizes the return of the fund subject to a 
fixed asset-allocation rule and duration matching. The model considers two types of 
instruments: cross-currency swaps and global bonds. The main trade-off in the model is 
the cost advantage of cross-currency swaps relative to global bond issuance. Cross-
currency swaps are, on average, a cheaper source of funding, but carry counterparty risk. 
The model penalizes a skewed maturity profile of liabilities because it carries rollover 
risks. The model also reports the implied asset-liability gap, which is a function of the 
total amount of cross-currency swaps. 
JEL classification: G32, G12 
Bank classification: Foreign reserves management; Debt management 
Résumé 
Les auteurs décrivent le modèle utilisé pour le choix des passifs du Compte du fonds des 
changes. La gestion du fonds des changes repose sur un cadre dans lequel les actifs et les 
passifs au bilan sont appariés étroitement au plan de la devise et de la durée. Le modèle 
relatif aux passifs aide le gestionnaire à choisir une structure qui, du point de vue tant des 
passifs retenus que des échéances, maximise le rendement du fonds compte tenu de la 
règle fixée pour la répartition des actifs et du principe d’appariement de la durée. Deux 
types d’instruments sont considérés dans le modèle  : les swaps de devises et les 
obligations libellées en monnaies étrangères. Le principal arbitrage concerne l’avantage 
de coût des swaps sur celles-ci. En effet, les swaps de devises constituent généralement 
une source de financement meilleur marché que les obligations libellées en monnaies 
étrangères, mais ils présentent un risque de contrepartie. Par ailleurs, un profil 
asymétrique des échéances est pénalisé en raison des risques de refinancement qu’il 
comporte. Le modèle permet en outre de calculer l’écart implicite entre la valeur des 
actifs et celle des passifs, lequel dépend du montant total des swaps de devises. 
Classification JEL : G32, G12 
Classification de la Banque : Gestion des réserves de change; Gestion de la dette 
 1 Introduction
The Canadian oﬃcial international reserves are held mainly in a government account called the Exchange
Fund Account (EFA). The EFA is a portfolio primarily made up of securities denominated in U.S. dollars,
euros and yen, special drawing rights (SDRs) and a small holding of gold. The objective of the EFA is to
ensure that the government can readily meet its foreign currency obligations (for example, to aid in the control
and protection of the value of the Canadian dollar, and to aid in meeting foreign currency payments to the
IMF). The strategic objectives of the EFA are to: (i) maintain a high standard of liquidity, (ii) preserve the
capital value of the fund and (iii) optimize the net return of the portfolio subject to the achievement of the
ﬁrst two objectives. The EFA is managed using an asset and liability matching (ALM) framework. Under
this framework, funds are invested in assets that match, as closely as possible, the characteristics of foreign
currency liabilities issued to minimize currency and interest rate risks.
To fund the EFA, reserve managers typically borrow in the form of direct foreign debt (of which global
bonds are the most common), the Canada bills program or domestic debt that is subsequently swapped into
foreign currency through cross-currency swaps (CCS). To fund the EFA assets means to issue a debt instrument
and use the cash proceeds to buy a particular asset that matches the currency and duration of that liability.
Generally, CCS debt is less expensive and provides more ﬂexibility in managing the debt maturity proﬁle of
the EFA portfolio compared to direct foreign debt instruments. CCS are derivative contracts with private
ﬁnancial institutions by which the Bank of Canada, on behalf of the Government of Canada, exchanges the
principal and future interest payments of a liability denominated in Canadian dollars for a liability in one
of the three EFA currencies. This form of synthetic debt exposes the government to counterparty risk and
introduces volatility to its budgetary position. Counterparty risk arises because of the possibility that the
counterparty might not fulﬁll its obligations when the mark-to-market value of the CCS is in favour of the
government. Budgetary risk arises because of the volatility induced by the mark-to-market valuation of CCS.
To choose the best funding strategy, reserve managers must account for the cost and risk characteristics of
each funding instrument.
This paper describes the liabilities model of the EFA. The model is a quantitative tool to measure the cost
and risk trade-oﬀ inherent in the funding strategy. Speciﬁcally, the strategy is the choice that managers make
regarding the funding sources of reserve assets in each of the three currencies in which the EFA holds assets.
The key trade-oﬀ considered by the model is that CCS are generally cheaper than direct foreign debt but carry
counterparty risk. The importance of counterparty risk stems from the possibility of such risks materializing
precisely during episodes in which EFA liquidity may be needed.
Other factors are also taken into consideration in the model. The maturity proﬁle that results after a
succession of funding decisions is important because it can result in a concentrated maturity proﬁle that
carries reﬁnancing risk in periods of market instability. A third consideration is the possible impact of CCS on
the government’s budgetary position. Given potential changes in accounting rules, movements in the mark-to-
market price of derivatives would have to be recognized immediately in the budget of the government. In some
situations, the government could ﬁnd itself recognizing the temporary net liability position of the EFA in the
federal budget derived from the mismatch in the value of assets and liabilities. A ﬁnal factor is the availability
of reserve assets in a particular currency and tenor with attractive yield. Given the ALM framework of the
1EFA, the choice of tenor of the liabilities determines the tenor (and duration) of the assets, which will aﬀect
the total net return of the fund. Therefore, the model restricts the asset-allocation rule in a way that reﬂects
the availability of assets in a particular class, tenor and currency.
For a given currency, the liabilities model solves a constrained optimization problem: to choose the mix of
CCS and direct issuance in a variety of tenors that maximizes the expected net return of the EFA subject to: (i)
aﬁ x e da s s e t - a l l o c a t i o nr u l ea c c o r d i n gt ot h eE F Ag u i d e l i n e si nt h a tc u r r e n c y ;( i i )ap e n a l t yo nr e t u r n si m p o s e d
when the maturity proﬁle of liabilities exhibits a heavy concentration in the short end; and (iii) an increasing
penalty on the funding costs for increasing amounts of CCS funding, to reﬂect increasing counterparty risk.
The model reports, but does not consider in the optimization problem, the implied asset-liability gap, which
is the expected diﬀerence between the value of assets and liabilities for a given amount of outstanding CCS.
The liabilities model is part of a larger research agenda at the Bank of Canada aimed at solving an
integrated asset-and-liabilities model. As opposed to other asset-and-liability matched portfolios, the EFA has
no anchor on either side of the balance sheet. For example, pension funds, which traditionally also operate
with an ALM framework, take the liabilities as given by the future claims of pensioners. Thus, the problem
that pension funds solve is the asset allocation that maximizes returns subject to a given level of risk. In the
case of the EFA, both sides of the balance sheet are choice variables; therefore, to solve the problem of liability
issuance, the model assumes a ﬁxed asset-allocation rule. This rule anchors the asset side of the balance sheet,
thus allowing the model to choose the liabilities that maximize returns given the risks inherent only on the
liability side. This rule complies with the guidelines established by the Statement of Investment Policy (SIP).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the EFA in detail, with a particular focus
on the liability side of the balance sheet, and explains the cost advantage of CCS over direct issuance. Section
3 describes the model. Section 4 shows the results of the benchmark exercise in U.S. dollars as well as results
from a few alternative exercises, including a euro version of the model. We assume that both the U.S. dollar
and the euro portfolios are independent of each other, since the size of the EFA and the shares in each currency
are decided yearly by EFA managers and, to some extent, are independent of the choices suggested by the two
models. Future research will address the asset side of the balance sheet by solving an asset-allocation model
with the simultaneous determination of assets, liabilities and currency shares. It is important to stress that,
for the purpose of this model, the size of the EFA is an exogenous variable. Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the EFA and Its Liabilities
2.1 The Exchange Fund Account
The EFA contains the majority of Canada’s oﬃcial international reserves. As of 31 March 2010, the total
oﬃcial international reserves were equivalent to $56.7 billion U.S. dollars, of which the EFA was equivalent to
$45.2 billion. The rest is composed of gold, IMF reserves and SDRs.1 Unlike most other countries, in which
the balance sheet of the central bank contains the international reserves, in Canada the reserves are part of
1These ﬁgures, as well as details on the legal framework of the EFA, can be consulted on the Department of Finance web-
site. The Department of Finance prepares a monthly report of the value and composition of the reserves and the EFA. See
http://www.ﬁn.gc.ca/pub/oir-ro-eng.asp. Also see the yearly report on the management of the EFA, Department of Finance
Canada (2009).
2Table 1: Term Structure of EFA Assets by Currency and Tenor as of 31 March 2010 (US$ billions)
US$ Euro Yen Total
Maturing in 1 year 7.34 2.08 0.09 9.51 (21.0%)
Maturing between 1 and 5 years 7.02 6.43 0.28 13.69 (30.2%)
Maturing after 5 years 10.43 11.58 0.0 22.02 (48.7%)
Total 24.8 (54.9%) 20.0 (44.4%) 0.30 (0.7%) 45.2
the balance sheet of the federal government. The Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada develop and
implement the EFA’s policies and funding program. As ﬁscal agent for the government, the Bank executes
investment and funding transactions and manages EFA cash ﬂows.
The objective of the EFA, as speciﬁed in Part II of the Currency Act, is “to aid in the control and protection
of the external value of the monetary unit of Canada.” This means that assets in the EFA are managed to
provide foreign currency liquidity to the government and to promote orderly conditions for the Canadian dollar
in the foreign exchange markets. The strategic objectives of the EFA are to: (i) maintain a high standard
of liquidity; (ii) preserve capital value; and (iii) optimize returns. Notice that the high-liquidity and capital-
preservation objectives go in the same direction in the risk-return space, given the asset classes in which the
EFA is allowed to invest. It is the optimization of returns objective that creates the tension between risk and
return in the EFA.
The SIP outlines the types of asset classes, risk exposure limits and other details of the EFA’s operations.
The permitted asset classes are mainly ﬁxed-income securities issued by governments, their guaranteed entities
and supranational entities. The credit ratings of the permitted issuers are constrained to the upper marks
of the main rating agencies. At the same time, the SIP details the upper bounds, as a share of the level of
reserves, that can be invested by each type of issuer depending on its credit rating. The SIP also establishes
at i e r e ds t r u c t u r eo fa s s e t st oa c h i e v et h el i q u i d i t yg o a l . T h eE F Ai ss p l i ti n t ot w ot i e r s : al i q u i d i t yt i e r
and an investment tier. The liquidity tier itself consists of two subtiers. Liquidity tier I consists of highly
rated short-term U.S.-dollar denominated assets, such as U.S. Treasury bills, discount notes and overnight
bank deposits, and serves to meet the core liquidity requirements of the EFA. Liquidity tier II is composed of
marketable U.S. Treasury, U.S. agency and supranational assets.2
Over the past several years, the size of the EFA has steadily increased from US$34.5 billion in 2005 to
US$45 billion in 2010. This increase in size is explained by the important role that the EFA plays within the
government’s Prudential Liquidity Plan. Table 1 describes the composition of the EFA’s assets by currency
and tenor.
There are several measures of the return of the EFA. The carry is a natural measure given by the ALM
framework. The carry measures the interest received on the EFA assets minus the interest paid on the liabilities
that fund the assets. If both assets and liabilities are held to maturity, the spread between the yield to maturity
of both is equal to the carry. However, this is usually not the case, for reasons that the next section will make
clear. Other measures of return, however, could include the eﬀects of interest rate movements on the price of
the assets. Also, periods of drastic movements in interest rates can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the performance
2For more details see http://www.ﬁn.gc.ca/treas/frame/gctrmf06e.pdf.
3of the EFA. The model described herein uses the carry as the performance measure to consider the third
strategic objective of the EFA: maximizing the return. This is done for simplicity and to avoid, to some
extent, making recommendations based on the eﬀects on returns from movements in interest rates during the
life of the assets.
The next section describes in detail the liability side of the EFA, and explains the types of funding available
to the EFA and their risk and cost characteristics.
2.2 The liabilities
The EFA reserve assets described above are funded by Government of Canada debt, either denominated in
Canadian dollars or denominated in one of the three foreign currencies in which the EFA assets are invested
(U.S. dollars, euros and yen). Canada uses several debt programs to fund the EFA: Canada bills, global bonds,
euro medium-term notes (EMTN), Canada notes and CCS.
The Canada bills is a ﬂexible short-term U.S.-dollar debt program. It is ﬂexible and reliable during periods
of turmoil because the placements are of a relatively small size. For example, the Canada bills program
provided access to funding during the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis. The term of these debt placements is less than
one year.
Moving along the term structure, the program to raise medium-term U.S.-dollar funds is the Canada notes
program. Its equivalent in euros is the EMTN program. These programs provide an opportunity to raise
funds through the issuance of plain vanilla or structured paper targeted to retail investors through relatively
small public issues, or to institutional investors through private placements.
During times of normal market conditions, most of the funding of the EFA assets is done through either
global bonds or the CCS program. Global bonds are syndicated placements in foreign currency (U.S. dollars
and euros), and are relatively large in size (around 2 to 3 billion). The yield of these bond placements is
generally attractive relative to comparable sovereigns, but is subject to market conditions at the time of
syndication. Also, given their large size, global bonds have to be planned in advance. To illustrate the funding
costs of this program, take the last two global bond placements. During September 2009, the 5-year US$3
billion global bond was issued at a cost equivalent to 3-month LIBOR minus 17 basis points, or a spread of
23 basis points above the 5-year U.S. Treasury benchmark bond. The 10-year placement of 3 billion euros in
January 2010 was issued at 20 basis points above the prevailing 10-year German benchmark bund.
CCS are the most ﬂexible and cheapest funding source. CCS are contracts with ﬁnancial institutions for
exchanging the principal and coupon payments of a ﬁxed Canadian-dollar obligation for U.S.-dollar or euro
proceeds. CCS are ﬂexible because they are over-the-counter instruments and consequently can be tailored
to suit speciﬁc requirements of size, maturity dates and coupon ﬂows. CCS transactions conducted by the
government are covered by unilateral credit support annexes in favour of the Government of Canada, meaning
that the government does not post collateral to oﬀset mark-to-market losses on CCS, but receives collateral on
its mark-to-market gains. To mitigate the negative impacts that the unilateral collateral requirements cause
to its counterparties, the government includes in its credit clauses a minimum amount of risk that it is willing
to tolerate without holding collateral. This threshold is dependent upon the counterparty’s credit rating.
To understand why CCS are a cheaper source of funding, it is necessary to explain how CCS contracts
4are structured. A CCS contract is basically an FX forward contract together with an interest rate swap that
transforms a liability in one currency into another while hedging the exchange rate risk. CCS are structured
as follows. First a domestic ﬁxed-rate liability is issued. A ﬁxed-to-ﬂoat interest rate swap converts the ﬁxed
coupon payments into ﬂoating ones. The relevant ﬂoating rate in Canada is the 3-month bankers’ acceptance
rate. The reason for this is that the market for currency swaps deals in ﬂoating rates. The currency swap is the
next step and it has two parts: ﬁrst the forward rate that converts the principal of the domestic liability into
U.S. dollars, and second the basis contract that converts the ﬂoating Canadian-dollar coupons into U.S.-dollar
ﬂoating coupons at the prevailing Can$/US$ basis rate. The forward rate is determined by the exchange rate
market, and the Can$/US$ basis is determined by the ﬂow of supply and demand for such transactions, which
is commonly a function of hedging activities. The 10-year Can$/US$ basis rate has historically been very
stable between 10 and 15 basis points, but during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-09 this rate moved drastically,
with liquidity and positions varying as the crisis unfolded. Notice that the domestic liability does not need
to be placed immediately before the other parts of the CCS contract. In fact, the domestic part of the
contract is tapped from liabilities recently placed by the government domestic debt auctions, which follow
their independent calendar and policies.







where USTzerois the zero-coupon rate in U.S. Treasuries, USDswpsis the U.S.-dollar swap spread, CADswps
is the Canadian-dollar swap spread, and basis is the Can$/US$ basis rate, all at time t and of tenor ⌧. This
formula does not take into account the forward rate, since it is locked-in, but the net funding cost in dollar terms
after exchanging the coupon ﬂows from Canadian into U.S. dollars. The euro CCS involves two additional
steps: ﬁrst a swap from 3-month ﬂoating rates to 6-month ﬂoating rates, which is the standard for the euro
market, and a US$/euro basis swap rate. This is the case because most of the world’s foreign exchange
derivative transactions are done through the main currency pairs, since they provide more liquidity than, in
this case, the direct pair Can$/euro.
The Government of Canada receives attractive quotes of swap rates because it presents very low default
risk to its counterparties. This is the main determinant of the low funding costs of CCS to the Government
of Canada. Figure 1 shows the estimated historical U.S.-dollar funding costs of 5- and 10-year CCS. This plot
shows clearly that the funding costs move with the U.S. Treasury rates. However, the relevant comparison is
the diﬀerence between the funding costs of CCS and global bonds. To estimate this diﬀerence, we need a time
series of the yield of Canadian U.S.-dollar global bonds. There are few of these bonds outstanding and they
trade infrequently in secondary markets; therefore, it is hard to obtain a direct measure of their yield over
time. To overcome this limitation, we approximate their yield by a linear combination of U.S. Treasury debt
and U.S. agencies. This calculation assumes that Canada can borrow (in U.S. dollars) at a lower rate than
agencies like Fannie Mae, and that the volatility of the yield is similar to the U.S. Treasuries. Figure 2 shows
the diﬀerence between the CCS costs and the global bond costs approximated as ↵USTzero+(1 ↵)GSEzero,
where ↵ is set to 0.8 and GSEzero is the zero-coupon yield of a bond index of U.S. agencies of the appropriate
maturity. All data are from Bloomberg.
















Figure 1: Estimated historical U.S.-dollar funding costs via CCS using equation (1) for the 5- and 10-year tenors.
The cost advantage of CCS comes with credit risk from the counterparties of these contracts. Therefore, the
longer the time between entering into a CCS and the fulﬁllment of the commitment, the greater the credit-risk
exposure. The credit exposure stems from the risk of replacing the coupon payments in case of default from the
counterparty (Duﬃea n dS i n g l e t o n2 0 0 3 ,a n dD u ﬃea n dH u a n g1 9 9 6 ) .A l t h o u g ht h ep r i n c i p a li se x c h a n g e d
at the beginning of the contract, the Government of Canada bears the risk of not ﬁnding a replacement of
coupon ﬂows at an attractive rate, as well as the risk that the prevailing exchange rate is diﬀerent from the
forward rate that was originally agreed to.
Another source of risk of CCS are changes in interest rates and exchange rates during the life of the contract.
This source of risk is relevant for the asset-liability gap, which is the diﬀerence in the mark-to-market value
of assets and liabilities. In general, the factors that move the mark-to-market valuations of global bonds are
tightly linked to the factors that move the valuations of the assets in the EFA balance sheet, since both are
ﬁxed-income instruments from highly rated sovereigns. However, factors that move the value of CCS can
at times be uncorrelated to the factors that determine the value of EFA assets. An example is the 10-year
Can$/US$ basis rate, which, as mentioned above, has been historically stable, but during the 2008-09 ﬁnancial
crisis moved drastically.
There are several variants to the structure of the CCS described above. These diﬀerences are important
to understand the liabilities model and the mechanics of the EFA’s liquidity tier. The CCS described above
is called ﬁxed-to-ﬂoat because it converts a ﬁxed Canadian-dollar liability into a ﬂoating U.S.-dollar liability.
However, it is also possible to structure a CCS that converts the ﬁxed Canadian-dollar liability into a ﬁxed
U.S.-dollar one. The diﬀerence between these two lies in swapping the resulting ﬂoating U.S.-dollar coupon


























Figure 2: U.S.-dollar funding cost diﬀerential between CCS and global bonds. The global funding costs use as a
proxy a linear combination of U.S. Treasuries and a U.S. agencies bond index. A number below zero implies that
CCS are cheaper than global bonds. During the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-09, this diﬀerence skyrocketed due to a
fall in U.S. yields. Note, however, that these are not transaction data. During the ﬁnancial crisis, there was very
little liquidity in the CCS market.
7Table 2: Structure of Funding by Type of Program for Euros and U.S. Dollars as of 31 March 2010. Figures are
in billions of U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. Excludes yen liabilities.
US$ Euro Total
CCS 19.4 17.2 36.7
Global 3.0 2.8 5.8
Canada bills 2.5 n.a. 2.4
EMTN n.a. 0.0 0.0
Total 24.8 20.1 44.9
into a ﬁxed U.S.-dollar one via a plain vanilla interest rate swap. Theoretically, the ﬂoat-to-ﬂoat and the
ﬂoat-to-ﬁxed are the other two possibilities, but these have not been used regularly in the past several years.
Normally, the ﬁxed-to-ﬂoat and the ﬁxed-to-ﬁxed are used to fund the liquidity tier and the term funding,
respectively. Short-term U.S.-dollar assets acquired for the liquidity tier are normally ﬂoating-rate instruments,
while the investment tier assets are normally ﬁxed-rate assets. This distinction matters for the dynamics of
the liability issuance decision because as time passes, some long-term assets become part of the liquidity tier.
Tracking these diﬀerences over time is important because the model allocates long-term funding only when
the liquidity tier funding has been satisﬁed.
Currently, CCS are the primary funding source of the EFA (Table 2). Only a small portion is currently
conducted via direct foreign currency debt (Canada bills and global bonds). Historically, the mix of the EFA
funding changed from direct foreign debt to CCS borrowings because of the cost advantage of the latter.
2.3 Literature on asset-liability models for reserves management
The ALM framework is widely used in the management of pension funds and insurance companies. The
literature on ALM portfolio management can be split into two camps: academic and practitioners. The
academic literature has evolved from work on portfolio allocation. After the work of Markowitz (1952),
portfolio theory has been extended from basic mean-variance analysis to more general risk-return analysis in
dynamic and stochastic settings (Cochrane 1999 and Wachter 2010), and to include frictions and more realistic
settings (Campbell 2006). More recent work on dynamic asset allocation in ALM settings is Detemple and
Rindisbacher (2008), which allows the value of the liabilities to vary over time. On the practitioners side,
Mulvey and Ziemba (1998) is the main reference. Their approach to solving ALM models is to specify a
ﬂexible objective function to accommodate general preferences; the approach deals with uncertainty and its
evolution by specifying a reduced number of scenarios instead of sampling a continuum of states of nature,
which is computationally challenging. For a broad review of applications, see the handbook of Zenios and
Ziemba (2006), which covers ALM models applied to money market funds, insurance and pension funds.
Few other central banks manage their international reserves as Canada does. To some extent, the Bank
of England manages its international reserves using an ALM framework. In England, this fund, called the
Exchange Equalisation Account, is divided between hedged and unhedged portions. To guide its decisions
regarding this account, the Bank of England uses a simple expected-return maximization model that focuses
on the likelihood of a call on reserves. Their main aim is to quantify the shadow cost, in terms of forgone
8returns, of maintaining a high standard of liquidity. Another approach to reserves management is the case
study of Colombia by Claessens, Kreuser and Wets (2000). The main contribution of their model, based on the
work of Mulvey and Ziemba (1998), is that it speciﬁes the diﬀerent institutional requirements and objective
function of a public institution when the objective of the fund is stabilization and not return maximization.
For a more detailed discussion of these models and issues, see Romanyuk (2010), which surveys the diﬀerent
approaches to modelling ALM portfolios. This paper is mostly concerned with comparing across literatures
the measurement of risk and return in ALM portfolios. The dynamic stochastic programming literature is
the state of the art in this area, but this approach falls into the category of large-scale models. For example,
the famous InnoALM model used by the Austrian subsidiary of Siemens was developed over the course of
several years by a relatively large group of researchers (Geyer and Ziemba 2008). The present paper takes
ad i ﬀerent approach: its aim is to measure in a simple way the main trade-oﬀsi nt h ef u n d i n go fa s s e t sb y
making a period-by-period issuance decision. The main downside of the non-dynamic approach is that choices
today aﬀect the set of possible future choices. Therefore, it is possible, at least theoretically, that cost-saving
allocations of liabilities can be achieved if these dynamic eﬀects are taken into consideration.
Conditional on the asset side of the balance sheet, the liabilities model is simply an optimal debt-structure
problem. There is a long literature on optimal debt structure in terms of domestic liabilities. Missale (1999)
surveys the issues regarding this problem.
3 The Model
3.1 Outline of the model
For a given currency, U.S. dollar or euro, the model chooses a mix of funding across instruments and tenors
to maximize the expected net return of the EFA subject to a given level of risk which, on the liabilities side,
is given by two measures: the credit risk from counterparties of CCS contracts, and the rollover risk inherent
in a skewed maturity proﬁle. The model takes as given the forecasts of funding costs and returns of assets.
It also takes as given the size (including future increases) of the EFA portfolio and the maturity proﬁle of
liabilities from previous funding decisions.
The funding options are restricted to CCS and direct foreign bonds. For simplicity, the model considers
two tenors for each instrument: 5- and 10-year CCS or foreign bonds. The model is solved period-by-period,
which implies that ﬁnancing requirements are met in full every period. Financing requirements in a given
period are equal to the liabilities issued in the past that come due plus increments to the EFA, if required.
The model has semi-annual frequency, and therefore needs semi-annual forecasts. The horizon of the model is
speciﬁed by the user, as long as the forecasts of yields and funding costs are supplied.
The period-by-period optimization assumption requires more explanation. It is possible for a dynamic
problem to achieve higher net returns if the ﬁnancing strategies take advantage of movements in the yield
of liabilities. However, the Government of Canada does not (traditionally) manage its liabilities actively.
Therefore, the funding costs are known almost with certainty at the time of issuing the liabilities. The only
uncertainty on the outstanding liabilities is the credit risk of the counterparties of the CCS contract, which are
discussed below. Based on this observation, the model assumes that liabilities, once issued, are never bought
9back, a strategy we call issue-and-redeem. Given this assumption, their yield is riskless (except in the case of
a call on reserves or a default of a counterparty of a CCS contract), implying that a dynamic strategy would
not be able to reduce the ﬁnancing costs.
On the asset side, the model assumes a ﬁxed investment rule across three asset classes: sovereigns, agencies
and supranationals. This rule is parameterized as portfolio weights for each of the two maturities that the
model considers, reﬂecting the current holdings of the EFA. Furthermore, the model assumes buy-and-hold
behaviour for the assets, which implies that the asset manager immediately acquires the asset that matches
the duration and desired yield for the given level of risk. In practice, however, this is not the case because
the initial purchases after issuing a global bond or a CCS are in assets that are easy to trade. In the case of
U.S.-dollar proceeds, these assets are U.S. Treasuries; in the case of euro proceeds, these assets are German
bunds. These assets, when purchased initially, have lower yields than the average asset held in the EFA.
In practice, the asset positions shift over time toward higher-yielding assets as they become available in the
markets.
The measurement of risk on the liability side of the balance sheet is given by two penalty functions: one for
credit risks and another for the maturity proﬁle. The penalty for CCS is an increasing function of the issuance
amount of CCS. The logic for the increasing shape is that CCS credit risk from default increases in the total
outstanding amounts of CCS contracts in the EFA. As the amount of CCS grows, in risk-adjusted terms, the
costs of issuance increase, with the increase coming from the implied replacement costs in the case of default.
The replacement cost function is parameterized with estimates from the Bank of Canada’s Financial Risk
Oﬃce. Section 3.4 discusses in detail the parameterization of this function. Another interpretation of the
increasing cost is that, as outstanding amounts of CCS increase, the cost of replacement increases, because
the likelihood of ﬁnding counterparties to replace a CCS contract from a defaulting counterparty decreases as
defaults can be correlated.
The model considers the liquidity tier to comply with the SIP requirements. The model separates short-
term funding requirements from term funding decisions. The total amount of term funding is equal to the
total amount of liabilities coming due in a period minus the total amount of short-term funding. Short-term
funding for liquidity tier I is allocated to 1-year bonds and ﬁxed-to-ﬂoating CCS.3
The model also reports a measurement of the expected asset-liability gap. This measure is computed using
as i m p l eO L Sr e g r e s s i o nt h a tr e l a t e st h eh i s t o r i c a lo b s e r v e da s s e t - l i a b i l i t yg a pt ot h ec o m p o n e n t so ff u n d i n g
costs in equation (1) and the amount of outstanding CCS. The intuition behind the regression is that the
volatility of the mismatch between the value of assets and liabilities has a price component and a quantity
component. Most of the variability is explained by the price component that comes from movements in the
swap spreads and the Can$/US$ basis, when interacted with the amount of CCS.
With this setting, the model abstracts from the eﬀects of currency diversiﬁcation. Solving one model
for each currency implies that there are no interactions between the returns of the assets in either currency.
Further developments will take into account the joint determination of the liabilities in euros and in U.S.
dollars.
3See section 2.1 for details on the structure of the liquidity tier.
103.2 Details of the model
The problem for each currency can be cast mathematically as a return maximization problem subject to a set
of restrictions and bounds. Given the assumptions on the penalties described above, the problem is a convex
optimization problem with a unique solution. The bounds are the restrictions that market conditions place
on volumes of issuance and the relation that prices have with volumes.






t )0 be the 1⇥2 vector of time t issuance in 5- and 10-year
tenors of instrument j = {b,c}, where c is CCS and b is global bonds. Let a(qc
t,qb
t) be the asset-allocation
rule which is a function that maps the value of the issuance (either in US$ or euros) to the portfolio holdings















for each tenor in the given




































where ↵⌧,  ⌧ and  ⌧ are the ⌧-year tenor portfolio weights. Note that for each ⌧ we need the restriction
↵⌧ +  ⌧ +  ⌧ =1 .N o t e a l s o t h a t f o r e a c h c u r r e n c y ( U S $ o r e u r o s ) t h e p o r t f o l i o w e i g h t s m a y b e d i ﬀerent,
depending on the availability of ﬁxed-income products and the revealed preference of the asset manager.
Again, for each currency, denote the ⌧-year returns as R⌧
t , which is a 3 ⇥ 1 vector for sovereigns, agencies
and supranationals. These returns are yields to maturity, and are therefore assumed to be known at time
t. Let S
j
t be a 2 ⇥ 1 vector of funding costs for instrument j at time t, with one entry for each of the two
maturities. Finally, let p(q
j
t;j) be the penalty function that incorporates replacement and rollover risks. Then




































budget constraint 1 · qc
t +1· qb
t = xt + rt,
law of motion yt + xt = q 1,
mkt limits qc  qc
t  ¯ qc,
mkt limits qb  qb
t  ¯ qb,
where xt is the total amount of term funding, rt is the amount of increase in the size of the EFA in period t and
yt is the total amount of liquidity tier 1-year funding. The quantity q 1 is the total amount of funding coming
due from previous funding decisions. It is calculated from the maturity proﬁle and includes the short-term
funding from the liquidity tier plus quantities of term funding that may come due in a given period. The last
two inequality constraints are market limits on issuance. The lower bar variables are the lower bounds and
11the upper bar variables are the upper bounds on issuance placed by the size of the market for global bonds
and CCS for each period.
Note that the objective function has no time discounting. This could be added if the aim in using the model
was to compute the present value of the expected net returns of the EFA. However, the aim is to determine the
period-by-period mix of funding. In this case, the time discount factor drops from the ﬁrst-order condition.
The intertemporal linkages of the model are via the “law-of-motion” equation, in which previous funding
decisions change the maturity proﬁle of the EFA.
The penalty function is parameterized as the addition of two exponential functions: one for the replacement
costs from counterparty risks and a second for the penalty from rollover risks from a skewed maturity proﬁle.
The replacement cost penalty is a function of the instrument and its tenor, while the penalty for the skewed





















































meaning that for global bonds there is no replacement cost penalty, since there is no counterparty risk in these
instruments.
The natural units of the model are in billions of dollars: therefore, the penalty function adds one unit to
each instrument in each tenor to avoid switching sign when q
j,⌧
t is below one billion. This scalar is subtracted
after the exponential, so the penalty starts from zero for zero issuance. Finally,  scales the costs into basis
points per billion. Importantly, penalties are a function of quantities, because these costs depend on the
amounts of outstanding liabilities.
The timing of the model is important. The model assumes that all amounts are due at the beginning of
each period. Issuance in the current period (which equal at least all amounts due) are issued instantaneously
also at the beginning of the period. Therefore, new issuance will come due at the beginning of the period of
its maturity. For example, say $1 billion comes due in the ﬁrst semester of 2010 which will be split evenly
between liquidity tier and term funding. Then the $0.5 billion issuance of 1-year bonds will come due in the
ﬁrst semester of 2011 and $0.5 billion of 10-year bonds will come due in the ﬁrst semester of 2020.
The treatment of the liquidity tier requires a more detailed explanation. According to the SIP, a minimum
of 10 per cent of the EFA assets must be held in short-term U.S.-dollar-denominated assets. These assets are
part of the liquidity tier, called liquidity tier 1. This only applies to the U.S.-dollar liabilities version of the









t,i is the par value at time t of the bonds and CCS with maturity i,a n d⌧ is the longest maturity
available in the EFA.  t is equal to 10 per cent divided by the share of U.S. dollars in the whole EFA. The
12requirements will change over time since the size of the EFA as well as the share  t varies over time, depending
on exchange rate movements. Note that the requirements and the actual liquidity tier are not always equal.













where ⌧0 is the 1-year maturity. When the amount of total short-term funding is below the requirements, the
model allocates automatically the shortfall of liquidity tier in that period. Moreover, the calculation of the
actual amounts of short-term funding should also include the ﬁxed-for-ﬂoating CCS, which serve the purpose
of funding short-term assets even if, in some cases, they are not due within one year. For simplicity, the
notation does not take them into consideration, although the model does.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the model are useful to understand the mechanics of the model. The ﬁrst-order


















where  t is the period t Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint. The condition states that excess
returns minus replacement and concentration costs should be equal across each funding source at a given date
t.N o t i c e t h a t t h e d i ﬀerence between the condition of CCS and bonds is that ✓ terms do not appear in the
latter. The condition for CCS adds both penalty parameters.
3.3 Algorithm
The algorithm that solves the maximization problem has two elements: ﬁrst, the exogenous forecasts of returns
and funding costs, and second the optimizer routine. Figure 3 shows graphically the mechanics of the model.
The structure of the model and the exogenous elements are fed into the optimizer routine, which numerically
solves for the quantities of funding of CCS and global bonds. The solution of the model is unique because the
surface being optimized is continuous and strictly concave in all directions and the bounds provide a restricted
search area.
The intertemporal linkages of the model are via the maturity proﬁle because the current choices change the
future required amounts of issuance in a given period. The algorithm uses the maturity proﬁle every period
as the state variable and is updated every period to reﬂect the period’s redemptions and new issuance.
3.4 Calibration of parameters
To solve the model, the optimizer requires the parameters of the penalty functions as well as the bounds on
issuance and the asset-allocation rule. The following are the bounds on quantities issued in a given period for
each currency (US$ and euro):
1. An upper bound on the volume of global issuance in the 5- and 10-year tenors of 2 billion per currency
per semester. The lower bound is zero.






CCS: [ 5Y 10Y]
Intuition:
•Inputs are taken as 




•US GSE yields 
•US$ supranational
CCS:      [ 5Y , 10Y] 




Min/max per instrument and per tenor
given
•US$ supranational / p p
•Rollover and liquidity tier:
Ex ante maturity profile
All amounts coming due are refinanced
Allocate first liquidity tier requirements
•Increase EFA size:
•All risk of the model 
comes from costs of 
replacing CCS  
(default risk) and Billions during a given amount of periods
•Risk adjustment parameters:
CCS default risk
Maturity profile rollover risk
•Buy  and hold and issue and redeem
(default risk) and  
from a skewed 
maturity profile 
(rollover risks)
Optimizer: max net returns subject to risk
•Each period choose 
risk adjusted funding 
mix
Output:
• Issuance decision per period
•Ex post maturity profile
•Limits the amount of 
total liabilities in a 
given year
Figure 3: Algorithm for the U.S.-dollar liabilities model. The forecasts of returns and funding costs are exogenous,
as well as the parameters of the function of penalties for replacement costs and rollover risks. Also, the bounds
given by market limits are exogenous. All these elements are fed into the optimizer, which calculates the funding
mix and keeps track of the next period’s maturity proﬁle.












































































Figure 4: Parameterization of the replacement cost function. The ﬁrst panel plots the replacement cost as a
function of the level of funding for three levels of the parameter ✓:1 . 6 ,1 . 3a n d1 .T h es e c o n dp a n e lp l o t st h e
ratio of replacement costs divided by the level of funding. This plot shows that, in the margin, a larger level of
funding implies a larger replacement cost. The rate of increase is a function of the exponential parameter in the
replacement cost function. On average, the replacement costs in the relevant range of 1 to 2 billion are between
15 and 20 basis points. Note that, to increase in the margin, the parameter ✓ has to be larger than 1.
2. An upper bound on the volume of CCS of 4 billion per currency per semester, which includes 2 billion
on each of the maturities. The lower bound is zero.
Another possibility is to consider a non-linear lower bound. That is, given the syndication cost associated
with the issuance of global bonds, its is unlikely to issue less than, say, $500 million. Therefore, the model
could consider issuing global bonds if and only if the optimal amount is larger than this bound.
The replacement cost function is calibrated to give penalties between 15 and 20 basis points per dollar
(euros) for issuance amounts between 1 to 2 billion dollars (euros). Figure 4 shows the dollar amount of the
penalty as well as the per-dollar amounts of charges in basis points for three parameters of ✓. The magnitude
of these charges were suggested by the Financial Risk Oﬃce of the Bank of Canada. For the penalty to
be increasing in the margin, ✓ has to be larger than 1. The maturity proﬁle penalty is also calibrated to
compensate for the lower net return of the long-term funding. This is discussed further in the next section.
The charge ranges from 10 to 20 basis points in the range from 1 to 2 billion dollars of funding.
The asset-allocation rules will be discussed in section 4.1.
153.5 Asset-liability gap regression
Finally, to report the implied asset-liability gap from the future funding decisions, the model calculates out-of-
sample forecasts using the regression described in Table 3. The regression calculates the implied asset-liability
gap using the total amount of CCS liabilities outstanding in every period from prior funding decisions and
the determinants of funding costs of CCS. Speciﬁcally, we regress the changes in the monthly asset-liability
gap against the funding cost determinants in equation (1), the level of U.S. Treasury yields, the U.S.-dollar
swap spread, the Canadian dollar swap spread and the Can$/US$ basis rate, all interacted with the period’s
outstanding CCS liabilities. We also use two dummies for outliers in December 2006 and January 2006. The
regression result shows that the level of interest rates given by the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is not important
for explaining the changes in the asset-liability gap. This is expected because both sides of the balance sheet
co-move with changes in U.S. yields and the U.S.-dollar swap spread. The main determinants for the gap are
the changes in the Can$ swap spread and the Can$/US$ basis rate. This is also expected because the factors
aﬀecting the valuations from global bonds and assets are very similar, thus leaving most of the gap variation
to be explained by the determinants of CCS that do not aﬀect the asset side of the balance sheet.
The out-of-sample forecasts are then calculated using the regression coeﬃcients of the asset-liability gap
changes; then level of asset-liability gap is computed using the previous period’s gap implied by the funding
decisions of the model. The initial level of the gap is the one observed in January 2010.
Table 3: Asset-liability gap regression using monthly frequency data from January 2002 to December 2009.
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. Constant and dummies for outliers are omitted. The variables are
the 10-year U.S. Treasury zero-coupon yield, UST10y;t h e1 0 - y e a rU . S . - d o l l a rs w a ps p r e a d ,USDswsp10y;t h e
10-year Canadian-dollar swap spread, CADswsp10y;a n dt h eC a n $ / U S $b a s i sr a t e ,basis;a l li n t e r a c t e db yt h e
value of outstanding CCS liabilities.
Independent Var D(ALgap)
D(UST10y ⇥ CCS) 0.0178 (0.2697)
D(USDswsp10y ⇥ CCS) 0.4393 (1.0113)
D(CADswsp10y ⇥ CCS) -3.1189 (0.8017)
D(basis ⇥ CCS) -4.6786 (0.9035)
R2adj 0.6852
Number of obs. 95
4 Results and Comparative Static Exercises
This section describes a series of exercises to illustrate the intuition of the model. We use the actual maturity
proﬁle data as of 2010 and run two sets of exercises: the ﬁrst without any penalties and the second using
the calibration of penalties discussed above. We also run another set of exercises with a theoretical perfectly
smooth maturity proﬁle, to show the implications of each of the elements of the model. These exercises
































Figure 5: Forecast of CCS and of global bonds funding costs. The left panel shows CCS costs computed using
equation (1). The right panel shows the forecast of global bonds funding costs computed as the linear combination
of U.S. Treasuries and U.S. agencies using a 0.7 weight for U.S. Treasuries. Agencies themselves are the government
yields plus the unconditional mean observed in the past decade. See the text for the values of these spreads by
tenor.
are comparative static exercises and are meant to illustrate the mechanics of the model while varying the
calibration of the replacement costs, rollover risks and size of the EFA. To perform these exercises, we need
asset returns and funding cost forecasts. The following subsections describe the model behind the forecasts of
the funding costs and asset returns.
4.1 Asset returns and funding costs
The elements needed to forecast the funding costs of the U.S.-dollar part of the EFA are the U.S. Treasury
zero-coupon yields, the U.S.-dollar swap rate, the Can$ swap rate and the Can$/US$ basis rate. CCS funding
costs are given by equation (1), in which the U.S.-dollar swap spread is equal to the swap rate minus the U.S.
Treasury yield. The global bond costs are simply a linear combination of U.S. Treasuries and the spread of
U.S. agency yields.
The U.S. Treasury yield curve is forecast using a modiﬁed version of the domestic debt model of Canada
(Bolder 2006), which itself is based on a Nelson-Siegel term-structure model. In this version of the model,
the main determinants of yields are past yields and the future ﬁscal position of the United States published
by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce. The U.S. Treasury zero-coupon curve used to estimate the model is the
one provided by the Federal Reserve on its website. The rest of the time series are from Bloomberg. The left
panel of Figure 5 plots the CCS historical and forecast funding costs up to December 2015.
We assume that funding costs of global bonds in U.S.-dollars are a linear combination of Treasury funding
costs and U.S. agencies. The forecasts of agencies are equal to the U.S. Treasury curve plus the unconditional
mean spread between the U.S. Treasury curve and the agencies’ yield index from Bloomberg. The spread
averages are 0.479 per cent, or almost 48 basis points, for the 5-year tenor, and 0.706 per cent, or 70 basis

















Figure 6: Forecast of cost diﬀerential between CCS and global bonds. A number below zero implies that issuing
CCS is cheaper on a cost basis than global bonds. By this measure, the 10-year CCS bond is the cheapest funding
source. On a net return basis, this is reversed because of the low return of 10-year assets.
points, for the 10-year tenor. Then the funding costs of global bonds in U.S. dollars are obtained by adding
a fraction of the agencies’ spread to the U.S. Treasury yields. The right panel of Figure 5 plots the estimated
global bond historical and forecast funding costs up to December 2015.
Figure 6 shows the forecast of the diﬀerence in funding costs between CCS and global bonds for both matu-
rities considered in the model. Notice that the forecasts predict that 10-year CCS are the most advantageous
form of funding. This, however, hides the fact that returns of 10-year assets are lower than that of 5-year
assets, because of the composition of both asset portfolios.
The asset classes considered in the U.S.-dollar model are sovereigns issuing in U.S. dollars (mostly U.S.
Treasuries), agency debt in U.S. dollars (also mostly U.S. agencies) and supranationals (for example, debt
from EIB, World Bank and others). To compute the supranationals, we add the unconditional mean spread
between the U.S. yields and the Bloomberg index of supranational debt in U.S. dollars. The unconditional
mean spread for the 5-year tenor is 0.341 per cent, or 34 basis points, and for the 10-year tenor it is equal
to 0.417 per cent or 41 basis points. According to the data, supranational debt in U.S. dollars has a lower
yield than U.S. agency debt. The euro version of the model is computed in a similar fashion, using instead
the unconditional mean spread between the yield of German bunds and the Bloomberg index of supranational
debt in euros.
Combining the asset returns, the parameters (↵⌧, ⌧, ⌧) for the asset allocation, we can compute per-dollar
net returns without considering the penalties for counterparty or rollover risks. This can be done because the
18net return does not depend on quantities outstanding or issued. On the other hand, the penalties depend on
the quantities.
The measure of net returns helps clarify the source of returns, because although 10-year CCS are cheap
to issue, there are a very limited amount of 10-year assets with an attractive yield within the SIP guidelines.
This is the case because the size of supranational placements, which oﬀer an attractive risk-adjusted yield, are
relatively small and are hard to come by.
The asset-allocation rules are given by historical asset holdings in the EFA for each of the two tenors. These
parameters are rough estimates and can be modiﬁed; however, they are good ﬁrst-order approximations. For


















These weights reﬂect the argument that in the 10-year tenor, it is diﬃcult to get supranationals and agencies
in U.S. dollars at an attractive yield. Figure 7 shows the time series of the computed net return over the
forecast horizon using the funding costs and the asset returns combined with the asset-allocation rules. As
mentioned before, the 10-year tenor does reduce its cost-eﬀectiveness because most assets tend to be placed
in low-yielding U.S. Treasuries. From a net return perspective, without considering any penalties, the best
funding source is the 5-year CCS.
4.2 U.S.-dollar unrestricted and calibrated exercises
The next three exercises use the actual U.S.-dollar maturity proﬁle and our forecasts of asset returns and
funding costs. The diﬀerence between the three exercises is the penalties. The ﬁrst exercise is without any
penalty for credit risk or maturity proﬁle. The second exercise adds the credit charge and the third exercise
adds the maturity proﬁle. To understand the pattern of issuance over time it is instructive to see the actual
maturity proﬁle of U.S.-dollar liabilities. Figure 8 shows the maturity proﬁle of U.S.-dollar liabilities at the end
of 2009 split into three categories: ﬁxed-to-ﬂoat CCS, ﬁxed-to-ﬁxed CCS and global plus Canada bills. These
exercises use the liquidity tier rule to allocate the appropriate short-term funding; the remaining amounts are
the ones shown in the following plots.
The result of the ﬁrst exercise is that term funding is allocated according to the highest net return subject
to the bounds placed by the market limits. This version of the model is not a convex problem because, without
penalties, the objective function is a linear combination of funding costs and asset returns. Therefore, the
model achieves a corner solution. Periods with no issuance occur when no liabilities come due. We use this
exercise as a benchmark because it displays the funding solution that would prevail without the risk adjustment
derived from the preferences of the government. Figure 9 shows the U.S.-dollar term issuance decisions by
funding source for every period when the penalties are set to zero. All funding is allocated to 5-year CCS
up to the limit of $2 billion per period, and the periods without issuance are periods in which there was no
term funding necessary, either because nothing came due or because the liquidity tier was not met during that




























Allocation Rules: [UST GSE SUP]
                   5Y:   .50    .25   .25
                  10Y:    1      0      0
Figure 7: Forecast of the net return of CCS and global bonds for the 5- and 10-year maturities. In a net return
basis (without considering risks from default and rollover), the 5-year CCS is the best funding source. The 10-year
CCS and 5-year global bond follow closely at around an 8 to 10 basis point return. The 10-year global follows
with a net cost at around 20 basis points.
















Maturity profile of USD denominated CCS Fixed−Floating
















Maturity profile of USD denominated CCS Fixed−Fixed 
















Maturity profile of USD denominated Bonds
Figure 8: Actual maturity proﬁle of the EFA at the end of 2009. The ﬁrst panel shows the ﬁx-to-ﬂoating CCS
which, due to their structure, fund the liquidity tier. The second panel shows the ﬁx-to-ﬁx CCS. The third panel
shows the global bonds and Canada bills.
20period. Also, EFA size increases are set to zero, which maintains the U.S.-dollar portfolio at $25 billion. The
parameters of the penalty functions are set to zero, thus dropping out of the objective function. Figure 10
shows the resulting maturity proﬁle, which is more skewed than the initial proﬁle because most of the issuance
is through 5-year CCS. The only remaining long-term liabilities are due to the binding market limit of $2
billion for 5-year CCS in periods when term funding exceeded $2 billion.
The second exercise results are shown in Figures 11 and 12. In this exercise, term funding is allocated to
5-year CCS up to the limit of $2 billion per period. The rest is issued in 5-year bonds because the charges
oﬀset the net return advantage of the 10-year CCS, but are not large enough to oﬀset the net return advantage
of the 5-year CCS. Note, however, that with the parameterization of the credit charge function, this version
of the model is a convex problem. The parameters of the penalty functions are ✓5y =1 .3 and ✓10y =1 .6.
With this parameterization for a $2 billion issuance of 5-year CCS, the penalty is equal to 15.5 basis points.
Thus, even with the penalty, the 5-year CCS is more attractive in terms of net return than the 5-year bond,
because the diﬀerence in their return is, on average, close to 20 basis points. The resulting maturity proﬁle is
completely concentrated between the 0 and 5-year tenors.
Next we take the calibrated penalties for CCS and for the skewed maturity proﬁle discussed above. The
results are shown in Figures 13 and 14. This exercise adds the maturity proﬁle charge to the credit charges. We
apply this charge only to the short-term U.S.-dollar liabilities because the eﬀect of this penalty is through the
relative changes in returns between short and long maturities. The maturity proﬁle penalty is 20 basis points
for funding quantities around $1 billion, with a parameter ⌘5y =1 .8.R e c a l l f r o m t h e ﬁ r s t - o r d e r c o n d i t i o n
of the model that the penalties add linearly and are subtracted from the net return of each instrument. In
short, the maturity proﬁle penalty lowers the relative value of short-term funding. Another way to do the
same would be to change the portfolio weights; however, the eﬀects through the penalty are more pronounced
because the penalty function is exponential, while the portfolio weights are linear. Term funding is allocated
more evenly to 5-year CCS, 10-year CCS and some 5-year global bonds. Still, 10-year bonds are not issued at
all. The maturity proﬁle is somewhat concentrated in the short term compared to the initial proﬁle.
Another output of the model is to compute the expected asset-liability gap. Since the expected gap is
computed period-by-period, this measure can be used to evaluate whether a particular funding plan would
imply at any point a large deviation (e.g., ±1 per cent of the EFA value) to the government’s budgetary
position. The expected gap is computed using the regression coeﬃcients and the total amount of CCS implied
by the funding decisions (see section 3.5). The independent variables are the funding cost forecasts and the
total amount of CCS implied by the funding decisions. Figure 15 shows the dynamics of the asset-liability
gap for the three exercises above. Note that, given the amount of CCS suggested by the exercises, the gap
remains around 0.5 per cent for almost two years before returning slowly to close to zero. In each exercise, the
implied share of CCS to total funding varies signiﬁcantly. Yet, as argued above, the main component of the
movements of the AL gap is the forecast of the Can$/US$ basis, not the total amount outstanding of CCS. In
the benchmark exercise, the share of CCS to total funding rises from 67 per cent at the beginning to 99 per
cent toward the end of the forecast period. In the exercise with the credit and maturity proﬁle penalty, CCS

























Figure 9: U.S.-dollar term issuance decisions over time for the benchmark exercise. Note that all funding is
allocated to 5-year CCS up to the limit of $2 billion per period. The periods without issuance are periods in which
there was no term funding necessary, either because nothing came due or because the liquidity tier was not met
during that period.






























































Figure 10: Resulting U.S.-dollar maturity proﬁle of the EFA for the benchmark exercise without replacement
cost or maturity proﬁle penalties. The ﬁrst panel shows the maturity proﬁle at period 1, and the second after 12

























Figure 11: U.S.-dollar term issuance decisions over time for the exercise with only credit charges. Note that all
funding is allocated to 5-year CCS up to the limit of $2 billion per period, except for the third period. The rest is
issued in 5-year bonds, because the charges oﬀset the net return advantage of the 10-year CCS but are not large
enough to oﬀset the net return advantage of the 5-year CCS.































































Figure 12: Resulting U.S.-dollar maturity proﬁle of the EFA for the exercise with only credit charges. The
second panel shows the maturity proﬁle after 12 periods. The maturity proﬁle is completely concentrated in the
























Figure 13: U.S.-dollar term issuance decisions over time for the benchmark exercise. Funding is allocated more
evenly to 5-year CCS, 10-year CCS and some 5-year global bonds. Still, 10-year bonds are not issued at all.






























































Figure 14: Resulting U.S.-dollar maturity proﬁle of the EFA for the exercise with penalties. The second panel
shows the maturity proﬁle after 12 periods. The maturity proﬁle is still somewhat concentrated in the short term
compared to the initial proﬁle.



































































credit and profile penalty
Figure 15: Implied U.S.-dollar asset-liability gap as a percentage of the U.S.-dollar EFA portfolio calculated
using the regression described in section 3.5.E a c h l i n e c o r r e s p o n d s t o o n e o f t h e e x e r c i s e s s h o w n a b o v e .T h e
independent variables are the funding cost forecasts and the total amount of CCS implied by the funding decisions
in each of the exercises. Note that, given the amount of CCS suggested by this exercise, the gap remains around
0.5 per cent for almost two years before returning slowly to close to zero for the three exercises, although they
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the implied share of CCS to total funding. In the benchmark exercise, at the end of the
exercise, 99 per cent of funding is in CCS, while, in the credit and proﬁle penalty exercise, CCS remain at 68 per

















































Figure 16: EFA size exercise. This plot shows the eﬀects of the EFA size on diversiﬁcation through the curvature
of the penalty functions. The exercise is to compare two funding strategies of diﬀerent size, all else being equal.
In the left panel the issuance is $1 billion and in the right panel the issuance is $1.25 billion every period, while
maintaining asset returns and funding costs the same as in the benchmark exercise. As the size of funding
increases, the 5-year bond is more attractive because both 5- and 10-year CCS become relatively more expensive.
The percentage increase in CCS is smaller than the increase in funding. The EFA maturity proﬁle is structured
to comply with liquidity tier requirements.
4.3 EFA size and diversiﬁcation
The next exercise illustrates the eﬀects of the size of the EFA on diversiﬁcation. The asset returns and
funding costs are the same as in the benchmark exercise. The penalty parameters are kept unchanged as well.
In this exercise, the results show the curvature introduced by the exponential function of counterparty and
rollover risk. The exercise is designed to force the model to issue US$1 billion or US$1.25 billion every period,
complying with liquidity tier requirements. At the US$1 billion level, and given the forecasts and calibrated
penalties, a 5-year bond is issued in small quantities. As the size increases, the 5-year bond is more attractive,
because both CCS become relatively more expensive. The share of the 5-year bond increases, while the share
of the 5-year CCS falls, as well as the share of the 10-year CCS (see Figure 16). The pronounced U-shaped
changes between 5- and 10-year CCS are a consequence of the narrowing of the diﬀerence of the net return
between the 5-year CCS and the other funding sources (see Figure 7). The main point of this exercise is to
show how the curvature of the penalty function changes the proportion of funding in each source, depending
on the size of the EFA.
4.4 Intuition of the results and interpretation
There are three main drivers of the model. The ﬁrst is the curvature introduced by the replacement cost
function of CCS and the penalty from a skewed maturity proﬁle. We assume that replacement costs are a
26function of outstanding amounts and are valued in terms of the expected dollar cost of replacement in case of
default. The curvature changes the allocation by inducing diversiﬁcation, because, in the margin, additional
dollar borrowing becomes relatively more expensive (riskier) in any source and tenor.
The second driver is the asset returns and funding costs. As speciﬁed in this paper, the funding costs of
bonds and the returns of the three asset classes are linear combinations of exogenous spreads and the U.S.
Treasury yields. From the ﬁrst three principal-component factors in the U.S. yield curve (Litterman and
Scheinkman 1991), only the slope is important for the model, since the level aﬀects both sides of the balance
sheet equally. The curvature factor does not play a role because the model considers only two tenors. The
slope matters because it determines the trade-oﬀ between short- and long-term sources of funding through the
interaction with the penalty for skewness of the maturity proﬁle, directly penalizing 5-year net returns.
The third driver is the size of the EFA. The larger the size of the EFA, on average, the larger the placements
required period-by-period. This is specially true during periods of EFA increases. The larger the amount of
issuance in a particular period, the larger the penalty imposed.
Judgment has to be exercised when interpreting the results, because of two features of the model. First,
the period-by-period solution restricts the ﬁnancing strategies available to the model. However, given the
limited amount of instruments available to the manager, this may not be a tightly binding restriction. It is
unlikely that the expected net return from more complicated dynamic strategies would be much larger, given
that the choices for issuance are limited to 5- and 10-year instruments. On the other hand, relaxing the budget
constraint assumption to allow more or less funding in a given period could signiﬁcantly change the results,
because, currently, the model is required to issue all of the amount coming due in a given period, while there
are other periods with no issuance at all. Given the curvature of the penalty functions, the Ramsey principle
implies that the expected net return would increase if the issuance could be smoother over time.
Second, the assumption regarding the market limits is that no more than $2 billion can be issued in a given
instrument in a given period. However, there is also a lower limit for a given issuance of global bonds, normally
at $1 billion per transaction. For the medium-term notes and European medium-term notes programs, this
lower limit does not apply because small placements are common. The size of a single global bond placement
is designed to take into account syndication costs. However, the model does not restrict the minimum size
because putting a lower bound would require that amount to be placed, while the correct restriction should
be that if there is a global bond placement, it should be larger than or equal to the limit. We avoid this type
of restriction because it would introduce non-linearities into the model. Therefore, when the model suggests
as m a l lp l a c e m e n to fg l o b a lb o n d s ,i tc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e da sa nu p p e rb o u n do fs u g g e s t e di s s u a n c e . A l s o ,i t
can be considered intertemporally, meaning that small placements over the course of several periods could be
lumped together in a single placement that satisﬁes the transaction size requirements in the market.
4.5 Euro exercises
For completeness, we perform a set of exercises in the euro part of the EFA. All assets and liabilities in
this exercise are quoted in euros and use the actual maturity proﬁle of the EFA at the end of 2009. We
construct euro forecasts of asset returns and funding costs in a way that is equivalent to the U.S.-dollar
forecasts. However, our assumptions for the asset-allocation rules are diﬀerent from the U.S.-dollar case,



























Figure 17: Forecast of the net return of euro CCS and euro global bonds for the 5- and 10-year maturities. On a
net return basis (without considering risks from default and rollover), the 5- and 10-year CCS are the best funding
sources. The asset-allocation rule used to compute net return in this case is for the 5-year tenor [0.15, 0.27, 0.58]
and the 10-year tenor [0.26, 0.45, 0.29].
















shows the expected net returns from each funding source based on these parameter values. Another diﬀerence
with the U.S.-dollar exercise is that the euro part of the EFA has no liquidity tier requirements. Regarding
penalties, we maintain the same penalty parameters from the last U.S.-dollar exercise.
Figure 18 shows the issuance proﬁle and the resulting maturity proﬁle. The results show that most funding
is allocated to 10-year CCS, except later in the sample, when the net return of CCS falls bellow the net return
of 5-year CCS. At around 1 billion euros, the penalty for the proﬁle renders both the 5-year bond and 5-year
CCS less attractive than the 10-year instruments.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a simple return maximization model to guide the liability issuance decisions of the EFA.
The model computes the trade-oﬀ between the cost of the debt and two sources of risk: rollover and counter-
party risks. The main drivers of the model are the penalties on the counterparty risk from cross-currency swap
contracts and the maturity proﬁle risk. The solution is period-by-period but, in general, a dynamic model
may not provide much greater beneﬁts given the institutional constraints on active management of liabilities

























































































Figure 18: Term issuance decisions over time for the euro portfolio exercise and resulting maturity proﬁle. Note
that all funding is allocated to 10-year CCS, except in one period in which a 10-year global bond is issued. The
ﬁrst panel shows the maturity proﬁle at period 1 and the second after 12 periods.
and  , that determine the net return of ﬁnancing strategies. This can be done numerically by allowing the
optimizer routine to choose these parameters to maximize the same objective function. In this way, the model
would consider the optimal asset allocation.
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